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Res ipsa loquitur rides again: Kennedy v Mackenzie considered 
Eleanor J Russell  
Glasgow Caledonian University 
 
The author considers the recent decision in Kennedy v Mackenzie [2017] CSOH 118; 
2017 G.W.D. 30-486 where the defender was ultimately unable to rebut the inference 
of negligence which had been raised against her in relation to a fatal road traffic 
accident. 
Introduction 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can often be of considerable assistance to a pursuer 
in a delictual action. Literally translated, the device means “the thing speaks for 
itself”. More loosely, one might offer the formulation that “an occurrence tells its own 
story.” While the pursuer normally bears the onus of proof in a civil case, res ipsa 
loquitur serves to give rise to an inference of negligence against the defender. The 
doctrine (which is capable of rebuttal by the defender) operates only in limited 
circumstances. The recent case of Kennedy v Mackenzie [2017] CSOH 118 provides 
an illustration of its application in the context of a fatal road traffic accident. In that 
case, the defender was ultimately unable to rebut the inference of negligence to 
which the facts gave rise. Before examining the opinion of Lord Uist in Kennedy, it is 
useful to explore some of the key authorities in which the doctrine has operated and 
to identify the necessary preconditions for its application. (It is perhaps noteworthy 
that the use of the term “doctrine” in this context has not attracted universal approval. 
In Lloyde v West Midlands Gas Board [1971] 1 W.L.R. 749, Megaw L.J. doubted 
whether it was right to describe res ipsa loquitur as a “doctrine”, stating (at p 755): 
“I think that it is no more that an exotic, although convenient, phrase to describe what 
is in essence no more than a common sense approach, not limited by technical 
rules, to the assessment of the effect of evidence in certain circumstances.” 
 
Res ipsa loquitur 
“It seems to me that the authorities clearly show that it is for the pursuer in an action 
founded on negligence to show that the defenders have been negligent, and that 
their negligence has caused the injury of which the pursuer complains. ” So stated 
Lord Cohen in Brown v Rolls Royce Ltd 1960 S.C. (HL) 22 at p 25. An important 
exception to this statement however arises in circumstances where the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur applies. Thus, in David T Morrison & Co Ltd v ICL Plastics Ltd 2014 
S.C. (U.K.S.C.) 222 Lord Hodge said (at para 98): 
“Where the facts give rise to an inference of negligence by the defender, the 
evidential burden shifts onto the defender to establish facts to negative that 
inference.”  
In Roe v Ministry of Health [1954] 2 Q.B. 66 Morris L.J. made the following 
observations about res ipsa loquitur (at p 87-88): 
"... this convenient and succinct formula possesses no magic qualities: nor has it any 
added virtue, other than that of brevity, merely because it is expressed in Latin. 
When used on behalf of a plaintiff it is generally a short way of saying: "I submit that 
the facts and circumstances which I have proved establish a prima facie case of 
negligence against the defendant."” 
In Ratcliffe v Plymouth and Torbay HA 1998 P.I.Q.R. P170 Hobhouse L.J. said (at 
P188-189): 
“The essential role of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to enable the plaintiff who is 
not in possession of all the material facts to be able to plead an allegation of 
negligence in an acceptable form and to force the defendant to respond to it at the 
peril of having a finding of negligence made against the defendant if the defendant 
does not make an adequate response.”   
Hobhouse L.J. went on to suggest (at P190) “that the expression res ipsa loquitur 
should be dropped from the litigator's vocabulary and replaced by the phrase “a 
prima facie case.”” 
It is only in certain limited circumstances that the maxim can operate. It does not 
apply where the cause of the accident is known. (See, for example, Black v CB 
Richard Ellis Management Services Ltd 2006 Rep L.R. 36.) In Milne v Townsend 
(1892) 19 R 830, Lord Adam stated (at p 836): 
 “[T]he res can only speak so as to throw the inference of fault upon the defender in 
some cases where the exact cause of the accident is unexplained." (emphasis 
added). 
The leading case is Scott v London and St Katherine Docks Co. (1865) 3 H & C 596. 
The plaintiff, a customs officer, was walking past a warehouse when he was struck 
by six bags of sugar. The bags were being lowered to the ground by a crane from 
the warehouse. Erle C.J. set out what is now regarded as the classic exposition of 
the maxim (at p 667): 
“There must be reasonable evidence of negligence. But where the thing is shown to 
be under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such 
as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the 
management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of 
explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose from want of care.” 
It follows that three conditions must be satisfied before the maxim of res ipsa loquitur 
can apply: there must be reasonable evidence of negligence; the circumstances 
must be under the control of the defender or his employees; and the accident must 
be of such a type that it does not happen in the absence of negligence. As all of 
these criteria were satisfied in Scott, the maxim did in fact operate in the plaintiff’s 
favour.  
In Cassidy v Ministry of Health [1951] 2 K.B. 343 the plaintiff was admitted to hospital 
to undergo surgery on two stiff fingers. He emerged from surgery with four stiff 
fingers. He relied successfully on the res ipsa loquitur rule. Denning L.J. stated (at p 
365) that the plaintiff was entitled to say: 
"I went into hospital to be cured of two stiff fingers. I have come out with four stiff 
fingers and my hand is useless. That should not have happened if due care had 
been used. Explain it, if you can." 
The maxim again operated to assist the pursuer in Devine v Colvilles Ltd 1969 S.C. 
(H.L.) 67. There, the pursuer suffered injury when he jumped from a platform 
following a violent explosion at his workplace. The explosion had occurred in a hose 
carrying oxygen. All the conditions for the application of res ipsa loquitur were 
present. Such explosions would not normally happen in the absence of negligence. 
The hose (the res) in which the explosion had occurred was under the defenders’ 
control. The exact cause of the explosion was unknown and although the defenders 
were able to demonstrate the likely cause of the explosion, their explanation did not 
establish that they were not negligent. The defenders thus failed to rebut the 
inference of negligence and were found liable.  
The maxim operated again in Mahon v Osborne [1939] 2 K.B. 14 where a swab was 
left in a patient's body following abdominal surgery, with the result that he died three 
months later.  
More recently, the maxim was successfully invoked in the Privy Council in George v 
Eagle Air Services Ltd and Others [2009] 1 W.L.R. 2133. The claimant sought 
damages from the owners and operators of an aircraft following her husband’s death 
in an air crash which she alleged was caused by pilot negligence. The defendants 
denied the allegations of negligence but advanced no positive case to explain the 
crash. The Privy Council held that res ipsa loquitur applied in the circumstances and 
the action succeeded. Lord Mance made the following observations (at para 13): 
“This was the defendants' aircraft, their flight and their pilot. Aircraft, even small 
aircraft, do not usually crash, and certainly should not do so. And, if they do, then, 
especially where the crash is on land as here, it is not unreasonable to suppose that 
their owner/operators will inform themselves of any unusual causes and not 
unreasonable to place on them the burden of producing an explanation which is at 
least consistent with absence of fault on their part. The defendants have in fact never 
suggested or attempted to suggest any explanation of the accident or any reason 
preventing them giving an explanation. In the Board's opinion, they have in the result 
failed to displace the inference of negligence which in the circumstances results from 
the crash itself.” 
It is clear from the above discussion that the maxim, res ipsa loquitur, has applied in 
a broad spectrum of contexts. Not all attempts to invoke it have succeeded however. 
An attempt to invoke the doctrine failed in McQueen v Glasgow Garden Festival 
1995 S.L.T. 211. There, a spectator at a fireworks display suffered injury when she 
was struck by part of a steel launching tube which fragmented when a firework 
exploded inside it. In a subsequent action against the company responsible for the 
management of the display, it was accepted that the explosion had been caused by 
a defect within the firework which had caused it to explode on the ground rather than 
while airborne. The pursuer attempted to establish fault against the defenders on the 
basis of res ipsa loquitur. She alleged that the explosion of the firework under the 
management of the company was the res demonstrating fault. The Lord Ordinary 
(Cullen) held that the defect in the firework was latent. There were no facts showing 
that the company knew or ought to have known that there was a risk of the device for 
the lifting charge or the delay mechanism being defective. The fact of the explosion 
was not, therefore, indicative of fault on the part of the company. It was instead 
indicative of fault on the part of the manufacturer.  
Rebuttal of the inference 
The inference of negligence raised by the application of res ipsa loquitur is capable 
of being displaced or rebutted. Thus, if the defender can establish a way in which the 
accident may have occurred without fault on his part, the pursuer is put back into his 
original position and must demonstrate negligence. In Ballard v North British Railway 
Co. 1923 S.C. (H.L.) 43, Lord Dunedin observed (at p 53) that the question was 
whether "the mere fact of the occurrence which caused hurt or damage is a piece of 
evidence relevant to infer negligence." He continued (at p 54): 
"But what is the next step? I think that, if the defenders can show a way in which the 
accident may have occurred without negligence, the cogency of the fact of the 
accident by itself disappears, and the pursuer is left as he began, namely, that he 
has to show negligence."  
In O’Hara v Central SMT 1941 S.C. 363 the pursuer, who was waiting to alight from 
an omnibus, fell onto the road and was injured after the omnibus swerved suddenly. 
She raised an action against the owners of the omnibus, on the grounds of their 
driver’s negligence. The defenders maintained that the driver had been compelled to 
swerve on account of the fact that a man had run across the road in front of the 
omnibus. That explanation served to rebut the inference of negligence.  
Rebuttal of the inference of negligence was eloquently described by Megaw L.J. in 
Lloyde v West Midlands Gas Board [1971] 1 W.L.R. 749 in the following terms (at p 
755): 
“The res, which previously spoke for itself, may be silenced, or its voice may, on the 
whole of the evidence, become too weak or muted.” 
Would the defender in Kennedy v Mackenzie be able to rebut the inference of 
negligence? Is it to that case to which attention is now turned.  
Background to the case 
The circumstances of the case are tragic. On the evening of 1 August, 2013 the 
defender was driving a Vauxhall Vectra motor vehicle on the A85 road towards 
Oban. Her partner, Vincent Kennedy, was a passenger in the front of the vehicle. 
During the course of the journey, the defender encountered a double or S bend in 
the road. On the second (or left) bend the car began to skid to the left. The defender 
steered the car to the right across the road into the eastbound carriageway where 
she collided with another vehicle. Mr Kennedy and a passenger in the other vehicle 
were killed. Several members of Mr Kennedy’s family sought damages from the 
defender on the basis that the accident was caused by her negligence.  
Proof on liability 
The case came before Lord Uist for proof on liability. Counsel for the defender 
accepted that the onus rested on the defender to prove a non-negligent explanation 
for her loss of control of the vehicle. The defender maintained that she lost control of 
the vehicle about fifty to sixty metres from the point of impact and that the road 
surface there was unusually slippery. She maintained that the slippery nature of the 
road surface was the cause of her loss of control and that she was unable to avoid 
the accident. At the proof, evidence was led from sixteen witnesses. There was no 
dispute that the defender had lost control of the vehicle. The issue in dispute was 
whether the road surface where the defender lost control of the car was unduly 
slippery and that that constituted the sole cause of the loss of control.  
 
Before reviewing the evidence, Lord Uist set out the applicable law. His Lordship 
stated (at para 4): 
“In certain circumstances an inference of negligence arises from the proved facts 
and it is for the defender to rebut that inference. This is one such case.” 
 
His Lordship proceeded to quote (at para 5) from the judgment of MacKenna J. in 
Richley (Henderson) v Faull [1965] 1 W.L.R. 1454 at p 1457 as follows:  
“I, of course, agree that where the defendant’s lorry strikes the plaintiff on the 
pavement or, as in the present case, moves on to the wrong side of the road into the 
plaintiff’s path, there is a prima facie case of negligence and that this case is not 
displaced merely by proof that the defendant’s car skidded. It must be proved that 
the skid happened without the defendant’s fault. But I respectfully disagree with the 
statement that the skid by itself is neutral. I think that the unexplained and violent 
skid is in itself evidence of negligence. It seems hardly consistent to hold that the 
skid which explained the presence of the defendant’s lorry on the pavement or, as 
here, on the wrong side of the road, is neutral, but that the defendant must fail unless 
he proves that this neutral event happened without his default. Whether I am right in 
this or wrong, the conclusion is the same: the defendant fails if he does not prove 
that the skid which took him to the wrong place happened without his default.”  
In Smith v Fordyce [2013] EWCA Civ 320, Toulson L.J. said (at para 61):  
“... in order for a claimant to show that an event was caused by the negligence of the 
defendant, he need not necessarily be able to show precisely how it happened. He 
may be able to point to a combination of facts which are sufficient, without more, to 
give rise to a proper inference that the defendant was negligent. A car going off the 
road is an obvious example. A driver owes a duty to keep his vehicle under proper 
control. Unexplained failure to do so will justify the inference that the incident was the 
driver’s fault. In the words of the Latin tag, the matter speaks for itself. In such 
circumstances the burden rests on the defendant to establish facts from which it is 
no longer proper for the court to draw the initial inference. To show merely that the 
car skidded is not sufficient, because a car should not go into a skid without a good 
explanation.”  
The defender in Kennedy averred that the SCRIM (i.e. measure of skid resistance) 
values for the road were deficient. She also averred that Transport Scotland ought to 
have erected warning signs detailing the slip hazard on the road surface. It was also 
said that the road was resurfaced about July 2014.  The defender claimed that she 
was driving with due care and attention, that she was not travelling at excessive 
speed and that she did not carry out excessive braking having regard to the 
prevailing conditions.   
The court heard evidence from Constable David Speir who was involved in 
investigating the collision as a standard collision investigator. He had conducted skid 
tests. His conclusion (as recorded by Lord Uist at para 15) was that the defender had 
“failed to negotiate a gradual left hand bend although the exact reason for this is not 
known”, but that “in the absence of any vehicle defect, road defect or involvement 
with any other vehicle the cause of this must be driver error.”  Another accident 
investigator, James McCartney, was also of the opinion that the cause of the 
accident was driver error. That error induced a skid from which the defender was 
unable to regain control. The vast weight of evidence indicated that it was not raining 
at the time of the accident, but that it had been raining earlier and the road surface 
was damp.  Lord Uist observed that it was clear from the evidence that there was no 
defect in the defender’s car or contaminant on the road which could have caused the 
accident. It was also agreed in a joint minute that the A85 was used by about 5,000 
cars a day heading in each direction. There was also evidence that in July 2013 the 
average daily traffic flow was recorded as 7834, equating to 3917 cars a day in each 
direction.  
Lord Uist stated (at para 27):  
“No other vehicle skidded on the left bend on 1 August 2013 causing an accident, 
there had been no skid at it in the previous six years causing an accident and none 
after the accident before the road was resurfaced in 2014.” 
Lord Uist went on to observe that Mr Dickson, a chartered civil engineer, who was 
led as a witness for the defender, accepted that it was unlikely that the road surface 
alone was the cause of the accident. His Lordship accepted Mr Dickson’s view in this 
regard. Lord Uist noted further that the police officers who used the stretch of road 
regularly had never experienced a loss of traction at the left bend. His Lordship 
continued (at para 27): 
“No other driver experienced a skid causing an accident over a period of about 
seven years. That fact is to me …a very strong indication that, at the time of the 
accident, the road was not so slippery as to be the sole cause of a vehicle going into 
a skid there.” 
 
Lord Uist concluded (at para 28): 
“In these circumstances the defender has failed to discharge the burden upon her of 
establishing that the cause of the accident was something other than her negligence. 
It follows that she is liable in damages to the pursuers.”  
Conclusion 
Kennedy v Mackenzie provides a useful illustration of the application of the evidential 
device commonly known as res ipsa loquitur. There may be differences of opinion as 
to whether res ipsa loquitur should be termed a doctrine, maxim or device. One 
might also, like Hobhouse L.J., even disapprove of the very terminology of res ipsa 
loquitur. What does seem clear, however, is that the maxim continues to play a 
useful role in civil litigation where the pursuer is unable to establish the precise 
cause of an accident. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
